as when the muscles involved in a behaviour-response grow in bulk through repetition of it. The same may be said of all habit-formation; if it be true that some neural growth (as of intimacy of connexion between neurones) is involved. And again there are responses intermediate in type, e. g., it is difficult to say that response to change of illumination by change of shape of chromatophores belongs definitely to the one rather than to the other class. Russell also points out that in plants, whereas behaviour-responses are comparatively rare, morpho-plastic-responses are abundant; and we have only to see them telescoped in time by the art of the camera, to appreciate the essential similarity.[1]

The ninth chapter presents the monadic theory of the organism; a theory usually associated with the name of Leibnitz. But that philosopher gave to his theory a turn that makes it really unworkable. He first, quite gratuitously, asserted that the monads have no windows (by which he meant that they are incapable of influencing one another), and then, to remedy the *impasse* thus created, he added the doctrine of harmony pre-established between all monads at the creation, a harmony which results in their all running strictly parallel courses, like so many precisely accurate clocks : a doctrine which is not only fantastically improbable in itself but also morally unsatisfactory in the last degree; since it involves as corollary strict determination and utter illusoriness of all human effort.

Several modern thinkers (especially the late James

Ward) have recast the monadic theory of personality in the more workable form which acknowledges the efficacy

[1] *The Study of Living Things,* 1924.